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*Comp. Law. 123 In a recent issue of Company Lawyer, the present writer discussed changes made 
to the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA) by the Insolvency Act 2000 that have 
made it possible for disqualification proceedings to be compromised by offer and acceptance of 
undertakings without the involvement of the court.1 It was seen there that the Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry's practice is to refuse to accept an undertaking unless the director concerned is 
prepared to make admissions as to the factual basis of disqualification and agree to the formal 
recording of the admissions in a schedule to the undertaking. The director is required to make the 
admissions "solely for the purposes of the [CDDA] and for any other purposes consequential to the 
giving of a disqualification undertaking". This means that the admissions can only be relied on in 
future CDDA proceedings2 or in other contexts where CDDA disqualification has a direct impact.2 
Patten J . upheld the Secretary of State's practice in relation to admissions in Re Blackspur Group pic, 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Eastaway, - a decision supported by the writer.5 The 
appeal from Patten J.'s decision has now been heard.2 The present article serves to revisit the 
background to the case and to reflect briefly on the out-come in the Court of Appeal. 
The two-stage test 
The decision to accept an undertaking is a matter exclusively within the Secretary of State's 
administrative discretion. The statute prescribes two criteria that must be applied to determine 
whether the Secretary of State is entitled to accept an undertaking. First, she must judge that the 
conduct of the person offering the undertaking makes him or her unfit to be concerned in the 
management of a company.2 In other words, she is required to form a view on the merits. Secondly, 
she must consider that it is expedient in the public interest for her to accept the undertaking instead of 
applying, or proceeding with an application, for a disqualification order.2 
Can the Secretary of State refuse to accept an undertaking unless the director makes 
admissions? 
In Blackspur, the defendant in a set of extant proceedings indicated that he wished to take advantage 
of the new law by offering a disqualification undertaking. However, he was unwilling to agree to the 
annexing of a schedule of unfit conduct to the undertaking from fear of stigma and the likely impact 
that any admissions might have on his accountancy career. He applied for the proceedings against 
him to be stayed or dismissed on the basis that the Secretary of State was acting ultra vires in 
insisting on a schedule of admissions with the result that the refusal to accept his undertaking was 
unreasonable. He contended that section 1A of the CDDA empowered the Secretary of State to 
accept a bare undertaking without admissions (i.e. an undertaking stating simply that the person 
giving it will not act in a prohibited capacity for a specified period) so as to eliminate the need for and 
costs of court proceedings. There was, he claimed, nothing in the legislation permitting the Secretary 
of State to insist on a director agreeing to a schedule of unfit conduct as a pre-condition to 
acceptance of an undertaking. 
The Court of Appeal upheld Patten J . and rejected the application. At the outset, Chadwick L.J. 
sought to formulate the question before the court in precise terms having regard to the wording of 
CDDA, section 7(2A) out-lined above. It was clear on the statutory wording that the Secretary of State 
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require a disqualification undertaking to be offered or given. The power conferred by the Act is to 
accept an undertaking which is offered and that power is circumscribed by the conditions in section 
7(2A). It followed that the relevant question was whether it is ever open to the Secretary of State to 
form the view that it is not in the public interest to accept a bare undertaking without admissions. On 
that question, the Court of Appeal made the following points: 
(1) The statute says that the Secretary of State may accept an undertaking if it appears to her that it is 
expedient in the public interest that she should do so. As a matter of statutory construction, there is 
no fetter (other than relevance) on the matters which the Secretary of State can take into account in 
deciding whether to accept or refuse an undertaking. If Parliament had intended that the Secretary of 
State should not take into account the desirability of a schedule of unfit conduct in exercising the 
discretion, it could have said so. 
(2) The Secretary of State was not acting irrationally, as in most cases she can reasonably take the 
view that a schedule will serve some useful purpose. A statement of agreed or undisputed facts will 
provide a useful starting point for the court on any subsequent application to vary or discharge the 
undertaking under section 8A or for leave to act as a director notwithstanding disqualification. A 
statement is also likely to prove useful as the basis on which the Secretary of State can publicise the 
fact that a disqualification undertaking has been offered and accepted and the underlying reasons for 
the disqualification. 
Comment 
The Court of Appeal has ruled that the Secretary of State does have vires to reach agreement as to 
the terms on which a disqualification undertaking is offered and that, ultimately, it is open to the 
Secretary of State to determine whether, in the public interest, she should refuse to accept a bare 
undertaking in a given case. Clearly, the Secretary of State's decision to refuse an undertaking 
offered in an individual case is susceptible to judicial review on grounds of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness. It seems, however, that, in the majority of cases, the Secretary of State will not be 
Wednesbury unreasonable simply because she insists on a schedule of admissions. 
The Court of Appeal's decision makes abundant sense on practical grounds. In any subsequent 
CDDA proceedings, the court will need to have a clear idea of the factual basis of the original 
disqualification. For example, on an application for leave to act as a director, the court must assess 
the nature and seriousness of the applicant's previous misconduct in considering whether leave can 
be granted. It serves the interests of efficient regulation for the parties to agree and set out the factual 
basis of disqualification in the undertaking. In the absence of admissions, the court hearing the leave 
application would be obliged to reopen the issue of the director's unfitness. 
The decision can also be supported on philosophical grounds. Directors' disqualification is justified on 
a rationale of public protection, including protection achieved through general deterrence and the 
setting of proper standards.2 Unless the factual basis of disqualification is made transparent, directors 
and their advisers will have no means of ascertaining what the expected standards are and how the 
Secretary of State is currently applying them. In this respect, the Court of Appeal appears to have 
struck the right balance between the overall purposes of the CDDA and the procedural streamlining 
that the reform seeks to bring about. 
It will be interesting to see how practice in relation to schedules of admissions develops. Clearly, the 
Secretary of State has been given the green light to continue with her current practice. However, 
whatever the practical and philosophical merits of schedules, it is to be hoped that we do not end up 
reproducing the often tortuous and costly process of negotiation that grew up in relation to Carecraft 
statements.— One point likely to arise in practice is whether, on an application for leave by a 
disqualified director, the Secretary of State would be entitled to adduce evidence of unfit conduct 
going beyond the boundaries of the agreed schedule. Intuitively, one would have thought not, unless 
the evidence came to light after the disqualification and could not therefore have been put to the 
director when the terms of the original undertaking were under negotiation. 
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For example, an application by the director to vary the undertaking under CDDA, s. 8A, or for leave to act as a director or in any other 
restricted capacity despite being disqualified. 
So, for example, a person disqualified under the CDDA is automatically disqualified from acting as a charity trustee but the Charity 
Commissioners have power to waive the disqualification provided the relevant charity is not an incorporated body. The Charity 
Commissioners could therefore rely on the schedule of admissions in deciding whether or not to exercise their waiver. 
Unreported, May 23, 2001, Ch D. 
(2001) 22 Company Lawyer 290 at 295-297. 
Unreported, September 13, 2001, CA. 
CDDA, ss. 7(2A), 8(2A)(a) and 9(1 A). 
CDDA, ss. 7(2A) and 8(2A)(b). 
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